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CONFERENCE SECRET

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MINUTES

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1. In order to deter aggression, the Alliance needs a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces.
2. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, with their ability to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack, constitute the backbone of NATO's military capabilities.
3. The tactical nuclear capabilities of the Alliance constitute an additional necessary component of the deterrent.
4. The Alliance needs sufficient conventional forces to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by confronting the Soviets with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on such a scale as to involve for them a grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.
5. On the Central Front, the present level of NATO forces appears to be adequate for this purpose but the question of imbalances in these forces remains to be discussed.
6. The question of where these forces should be located remains to be discussed in the light of the prospect of political and military warning, ability to react, capacity and speed of reenforcement, economic considerations and the political impact of any new deployments on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

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